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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
GILL THOMAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14416 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with distributing a controlled 
substance in violation of Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 197 5), 
Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried, without a jury, in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding, on the 10th of December, 
197 5. Appellant was found guilty as charged and was sentenced 
to less than ten years in the Utah State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have appellant's conviction 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 10, 1975, Police Officers Roberts 
and Mendez picked up Denise Giertz at her home and took 
her to the station. There she was strip-searched by 
Sandy Ellison (T-96). After the search, Miss Giertz 
was dropped off in Salt Lake and given $150.00 with 
which to make a buy (T-5). Miss Giertz went to see 
appellant and upon finding him gave him fifty dollars 
in exchange for a package which was found to contain 
cocaine (T-11,92). Miss Giertz returned to the police 
car and was taken to the police station and again 
searched (T-94). 
After picking up Miss Giertz but before re-
turning to the police station, Officer Roberts received 
information of a possible robbery. He left Miss Giertz 
alone in Pioneer Park for a few minutes while he checked 
out the report (T-58,59). During that time Officer 
Roberts held the package and the remaining $100.00 in 
his hand (T-59). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY 
OF TWO WITNESSES WHOSE NAMES XtfERE NOT ON THE INFORMATION* 
At trial the prosecution called two witnesses 
whose names were not listed on the information. Sandy 
Ellison testified that she searched Miss Giertz be-
fore and after the buy? and Donald Gunderson, a toxicologist, 
testified that the purchased substance was cocaine. 
Appellant claims error. Respondent submits that the 
information must include the names of all witness who 
testified at the preliminary hearing and thus, that the 
information in the present case was valid. Section 
77-17-4, U.C.A. (Supp. 1975), is as follows: 
"An information must recite the 
fact of the commitment of binding 
over of the defendant by a magistrate 
and the names of the witnesses testi-
fying for the state on such examination 
must be indorsed thereon. (Emphasis 
added)." 
The purpose of the information is to show that the 
court has found sufficient cause to hold or bind over 
a defendant for trial. The names of witnesses on the 
information are simply those upon whofs testimony 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the binding over rests. This is supported by reading 
Section 77-21-52, U.C.A. (Supp. 1975): 
"When an information or indictment 
is filed, the names of all witnesses 
or deponents on whose evidence the 
information or indictment was based 
shall be indorsed thereon, . . •" 
(emphasis added) 
Since the names of all witnesses on whose evidence the 
information was based were in fact indorsed thereon, 
the information was valid. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that additional 
names of witnesses may be placed on an information at any 
time, even during the actual trial. State v. Redmond, 
19 Utah 2d 272, 430 P.2d 901 (1967). The Court has 
also held that using witnesses not listed on an informa-
tion, if error at all, is treated as any other error. 
That is, appellant, to prevail on appeal, must demon-
strate prejudice as a result of the error. Otherwise, 
the error is considered harmless. State v. Redmond, 
supra, and State v. Kish, 28 U. 2d 430, 434, 503 P.2d 
1208 (1972). Appellant claims prejudice in that he was 
surprised at trial and therefore unable to effectively 
cross-examine the extra witnesses. Respondent will show 
that there was no prejudice. 
Almost every narcotics case includes an ex-
pert who testifies as to the identity of the "white 
powder". Surely appellant did not think that the state 
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would neglect an important element of proof. Logically 
speaking, if appellant actually believed that there 
were possible grounds on which to challenge the 
identity of the substance, he would have been pre-
pared to make a challenge to prosecution evidence 
or to put on his own evidence as a defense. On the 
other hand, if appellant was not prepared, as he 
claims is the case, to attack identification testimony, 
the implication is that he was prepared to stipulate• 
As a matter of fact, appellant, at the preliminary 
hearing, stipulated to the testimony which Donald 
Gunderson was then prepared to offer. Obviously, 
appellant has failed to show actual prejudice from 
Mr* Gundersonfs testimony. 
The testimony of Sandy Ellison was also 
non-prejudicial to the defendant• She simply 
related that she searched Miss Giertz for money 
and drugs and found neither. Appellant conducted a 
vigorous and efficient cross-examination of this 
witness and thus protected his rights. 
The major question to consider is whether or 
not a different verdict would have resulted if Miss 
Ellison had not testified. The answer is that the 
verdict would still have been "guilty". Even if there 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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had been no search, that fact would carry no more weight 
than the fact that Miss Giertz was outside of the 
officers view after the search, that she was left 
alone in Pioneer Park for a short time prior to the 
second search, or that she made the buy inside a 
house where the officers could not see her. The 
search was of little importance. Therefore, testimony 
of it certainly did not prejudice appellant. Since 
there was no prejudice, the error was harmless and 
appellant's conviction should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WELL WITHIN PROPER BOUNDS 
OF DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THREE WITNESSES TO MARK THE 
SAME DIAGRAM. 
After the prosecution finished questioning 
Denise Giertz, defense counsel began his cross-
examination. During that cross-examination, defense 
counsel had Miss Giertz make a diagram of the scene 
of the crime. The diagram included the streets and 
buildings in the area where the buy was made (T-22) • 
The prosecution never asked Miss Giertz any questions 
pertaining to the diagram. The prosecution then called 
Officer Roberts to the stand. Officer Roberts was asked 
to take a look at the diagram Miss Giertz had made and 
to mark the location where he had dropped Miss Giertz 
off, where he had waited while she made the buy, and 
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where he later picked her up. Defense counsel ob-
jected to Officer Roberts using the same diagram, 
however, the trial court ruled that he could do 
so (T-56). Defense counsel then cross-examined 
Officer Roberts with respect to the diagram. The 
prosecution then called Officer Mendez and the same 
things transpired (T-71). 
Appellant alleges that the trial court 
abused its discretion in allowing more than one 
witness to mark the diagram after the witness 
exclusion rule had been evoked. Respondent submits 
that the trial court was well within its discretion 
in ruling as it did. Furthermore, even if the trial 
court erred, there was absolutely no prejudice. 
Finally, since defense counsel also questioned three 
witnesses with the use of the diagram, thus doing the 
very thing he now condemns as error, he can not be 
allowed to complain of the error. 
The Utah rule for excluding witnesses is found 
in Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1975), Section 78-7-4: 
". . .in any cause the court may, 
in its discretion, during the examina-
tion of a witness, exclude any and all 
other witnesses in the cause." 
(Emphasis added) 
-7-
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It is important to note that the statute says 
that the court "may" rather than the court "must" 
exclude witnesses. The Utah Supreme Court supports 
this construction* In State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 
269 P. 480 (1928), the court held that a trial court 
may refuse to grant a request to exclude and that 
there is no absolute right to have any witnesses ex-
cluded. Almost every other state has the same rule 
which is well exemplified by the Supreme Court of 
Colorado: 
"Whether the exclusion is initially 
invoked and if invoked, what constitutes 
a violation thereof, and even if it be 
determined that there was a violation, 
what penalty should be imposed or 
whether the offending witness should 
be allowed to testify, are all matters 
resting within the sound discretion 
of the court." Hampton v. People, 171 
Colo. 153, 465 P.2d 394, 399 (1970) 
(Emphasis added) 
See also: State v. Schoenberger, 216 Kan. 464, 532 
P.2d 1085 (1975); State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 
P.2d 553 (1970); State v. Kijowski, 85 N.Mex. 549, 
514 P.2d 306 (1973); Gee v. State, 538 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 
1975); and State v. Hargrove, 11 Or. App. 486, 503 P.2d 
721 (1972). 
Since it was within the judge's discretion 
whether to exclude the witnesses, it would certainly be 
within his discretion to allow them to use the same 
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diagram. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that they will not distrub any decision within the 
discretion of a trial court unless there is a clear 
showing of arbitrary and capricious abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Chambers, 533, P.2d 876 ( Utah 
1975} . 
Even if the trial court erred there was no 
prejudice to appellant. Without a showing of prejudice 
the error is harmless and cannot be used to assault 
a conviction. State v. Winkle, 535 P.2d 82 (Utah 
197 5). An examination of the testimony of the three 
witnesses proves that their use of the common diagram 
was not prejudicial to appellant. 
Defense counsel had Miss Giertz diagram the 
scene and mark where Officer Roberts had dropped 
her off and later picked her up (T~22). When Roberts 
testified he marked the diagram to show his version 
of where these things occurred (T-56). It is interesting 
to note that the witnesses disagreed on the location 
of the pickup (T-64). Obviously Roberts was not in-
fluenced by Miss Giertz's markings. Defense counsel 
used the diagram to prove that neither Officer Roberts 
nor Mendez could have actually seen the transaction 
take place. The diagram did so prove, and thus was 
effective, not prejudicial for appellant. 
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Finally, appellant alleges that Officer Mendez 
and Miss Giertz were unable to agree as to the details 
of the house, the clothing worn by different persons, 
and various distances. Appellant claims that this 
shows that the diagram was unduly suggestive (appellant's 
brief p. 5). There is a major fault in this reasoning. 
The fact of disagreement proves conclusively that the 
diagram was not suggestive. Also, the diagram had 
nothing on it to indicate the odor of clothes or 
details of construction. There was no prejudice in 
the use of the diagram* 
Finally, defense counsel, himself, questioned 
three witnesses with the use of the same diagram. 
(T-22,63,76). Since he did the very thing which he 
claims is error, he should not prevail on appeal. 
State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 501 P.2d 107 (1972)• 
Respondent submits that the trial court acted 
with proper bounds of discretion, that any error was 
harmless, and that appellant committed the same error, 
thus the conviction should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE STATE PROVED ITS CASE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
In appellant's third point on appeal, he 
attempts to raise several doubts as to the weight to 
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be given evidence, credibility of witnesses, and possible 
theories of the case. Respondent submits that appellant 
completely misunderstands the purpose of appeal. The 
rule in Utah and almost, if not all, other jurisdictions 
is that the appellate court is obliged to view evidence 
in accordance with the trial courts finding of guilt* 
State v. Simpson, 541 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1975). Also the 
appellant court must view whatever inferences may be 
fairly and reasonably drawn from the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict. Simpson, supra. 
As the Kansas Supreme Court said, an appellate court, 
upon reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, examines 
that evidence which favors the verdict. It does not 
weigh the evidence, and if the essential elements of 
the charge are sustained by any competent evidence, the 
conviction should stand. State v. Pettay, 216 Kan. 
555, 532 P.2d 1289 (1975). See also State v. Vigil, 
87 N. Mex. 345, 533 P.2d 578 (1975), and Shafsky v. 
State, 526 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1974). 
The reason for this rule is because the jury, 
or trial court if there is no jury, has the responsi-
bility of determining the facts of the case, of judging 
the credibility of the witnesses, and of weighing the 
evidence. The finder-of-fact can observe the facial 
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expressions, mannerisms, and tone of voice of v/itnesses 
and thus is in the best position to determine who is 
telling the truth or how much weight to give certain 
testimony. 
For the above reasons, appellant's third 
point of error should be dismissed* Appellant had a 
full opportunity to present his case to the finder 
of fact. He was allowed to argue any theory he felt 
was necessary. He was given full freedom to cross-
examine all witnesses and to point out any inconsistcmcies 
in their testimony. Appellant does not, however, 
have the prerogative to judge the case. His arguments 
and allegations concerning weight and credibility have 
no place before this court. 
Appellant claims that when Miss Giertz was 
searched by Sandy Ellison, prior to making the buy, 
the search was improperly done. Looking at the 
evidence in the light favorable to the verdict, we 
must assume that the search was proper. There is much 
evidence to show that it was. Miss Giertz stripped and 
was thoroughly examined including hair, mouth, anus, 
and vagina (T-94,96). 
Appellant claims that Miss Giertz was an 
addict and that the police put pressure on her to make 
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buys for them. This goes to weight, not admissibility. 
Appellant also claims Miss Giertz was hazy on her 
recollections. Again, this is a question of weight. 
Finally, appellant claims that Officer Roberts 
probably made up a story about holding evidence in his 
hand while investigating a robbery. Again, this a 
a jury question of credibility. On appeal there is no 
choice other than to believe the Officer1s story 
because of the verdict of the lower court. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no error in allowing two witnesses 
to testify whose names were not on the information. 
Furthermore, the trial court used proper discretion 
in allowing three witnesses to mark the same diagram. 
Finally, the State proved its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Respondent submits that appellantfs conviction 
should be affirmed• 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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